

UK
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHN FREEMAN
TO THE SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MAY 2005.

MAIN COMMITTEE II

Mr Chairman,

1. The United Kingdom fully supports the statement made on behalf of the EU by the distinguished Ambassador of Luxembourg but would like to add a few national comments on issues of particular importance to us.
2. The UK agrees that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol represent today's verification standard. The UK hopes that this conference will send a clear message to this effect to the IAEA's Board of Governors.
3. Allow me to recall that in reaction to the events in Iraq and the DPRK in the early 1990s, the IAEA Board of Governors revised the Safeguards regime. The UK believes that it is right that the safeguards regime should be subject to continuous review. We need to give the Agency the best possible resources and tools. If that means looking at new technologies, new techniques or new sources of information, so be it: the Agency must be allowed to develop its methods. They do not represent a threat to States' Article IV rights. On the contrary, the existence of a robust safeguards regime will underpin these rights.
4. In this context let me touch on the Small Quantities Protocol which the Director General of the IAEA recently described as a weakness in the safeguards system. The UK looks forward to participating in the review of the SQP mechanism which the Director General has initiated and to subsequent decisions over its future by the Board of Governors. We hope this committee will stress the need to address this weakness in the Safeguards framework.
5. This committee also needs to consider the implications of illicit trafficking undertaken by the A. Q. Khan network. Last year, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which called upon all States to establish, develop, review and maintain effective export controls. We believe that by implementing that resolution, States will

be taking steps to control illicit trafficking and that this committee should send a strong message in support of resolution 1540.

6. The UK has already taken steps to introduce strengthened export control legislation. As part of the wider multilateral framework, the UK is committed to working in the International Maritime Organisation to secure amendments to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention, which will make it an internationally recognised offence to transport WMD, their delivery systems and related materials on commercial vessels. We urge all States Party to the Convention to endorse these amendments.

7. The Zangger Committee has produced a report to this conference. This committee could recognise the work of this body and reaffirm the invitation in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference *“to consider applying the understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear cooperation with Non-Nuclear-Weapon States not parties to the Treaty”*. .

Mr Chairman

8. You will recall Libya’s decision to dismantle its illegal WMD programmes in 2003. The UK warmly welcomed this decision. We have worked since in partnership with other nations and organisations to bring Libya into compliance with its international obligations. We urge any other State engaged in a programme of clandestine procurement for nuclear weapons purposes, in contravention of NPT undertakings, to follow Libya’s example; to renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons; and to dismantle and destroy any facilities or equipment associated with such a programme.

9. Along with many others, we have concerns about the proliferation implications of Iran’s nuclear programme. As you will be aware, Mr Chairman, we are working with EU partners to develop long-term arrangements that will help rebuild international confidence in Iran’s nuclear activities and plans. These must be underpinned by objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

10. We welcome Iran’s decision to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while agreements on long-term solutions are

negotiated and remain committed to seeing mutually acceptable long-term arrangements with Iran. But this can only be within the context of the 15 November “Paris Agreement”. We are concerned by recent statements that it intends to resume the conversion of uranium at its facility in Esfahan. We have urged Iran to continue to fulfil its commitments under the Paris Agreement, including the suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

11. We would like to see Iran working actively with the IAEA Secretariat to resolve all outstanding questions surrounding its programme. We would also like Iran to comply with all Board of Governors’ requests, including, in particular, reconsideration of its decision to construct a heavy water moderated research reactor in Arak. You will be aware that such a reactor design poses a significant proliferation threat.

12. We are deeply concerned by the DPRK’s announcement that it intended to reprocess further fuel from the Yongbyon reactor and its claimed possession of nuclear weapons in violation of its commitments under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement. We call on it to cease such threatening activities, to declare all past nuclear activity and to dismantle completely, verifiably and irreversibly its nuclear programme. We urge it to return unconditionally to the Six Party Talks at the earliest opportunity.

13. Mr Chairman, allow me to underline the United Kingdom’s support for the principle of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The UK plays an active and constructive role as a Nuclear Weapon State in their development. The UK has signed and ratified protocols to the zones which cover Latin America and the Caribbean - the Tlatelolco Treaty; Africa - the Pelindaba Treaty; and the South Pacific - the Rarotonga Treaty. We continue to work with the ASEAN States to produce an agreed protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok, and hope ASEAN will continue consultations with the Nuclear Weapon States to that the Protocol can be concluded. We support the proposed Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and wish to continue consultations on the proposed draft Treaty and Protocol with the five Central Asian states in question, together with the other Nuclear Weapon States, so that they may be completed before the Central Asian States sign the Treaty.

14. We continue to support the Resolution on the Middle East from the 1995 NPT Review Conference. In particular, we have consistently

supported a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and more broadly, a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Together with our European partners we have carried out extensive lobbying activity to secure adherence by States in the Middle East to key non-proliferation agreements.

Thank you Mr Chairman.