

**STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PETER JENKINS
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ORGANISATIONS AT VIENNA
TO THE SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MAY 2005.**

MAIN COMMITTEE III

Madam Chair,

1. As this is the first time that I am taking the floor I would like to congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of this Committee. May I assure you of the fullest co-operation of the United Kingdom delegation.
2. My delegation naturally supports the comprehensive statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union. I would like to confine my intervention to a few of the issues on which he touched.

ARTICLE X

3. This Committee has been asked to consider the serious issue of the withdrawal of a State Party from the NPT. The UK aligns itself with the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Luxembourg, as Presidency of the European Union, in this regard, and with the views and ideas expressed in the Working Paper laid before the Conference as NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32. This paper sets out how such a serious threat to international peace and security might be tackled and discouraged, particularly through denying such States the continued benefit from nuclear technologies obtained while a State Party, or in furtherance of a nuclear weapon programme. Madam Chair, I commend this excellent paper to this Committee and to its Subsidiary Body and look forward to discussing it in detail in the Subsidiary Body.

ARTICLE IV – RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

4. The Treaty specifies that the right of parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is inalienable. In the view of this delegation that does not make it absolute or unconditional. The exercise of this right depends on compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty and with the safeguards provisions of Article III. When a State fails to meet these compliance obligations, it necessarily forfeits confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear ambitions. Until confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities and intentions has been rebuilt, it must expect suppliers to deny it proliferation-sensitive technologies on prudential grounds, and must expect a sceptical reaction to the invocation of rights.
5. Furthermore, recent experiences have drawn attention to the risks inherent in regarding Article IV rights as extending without distinction to all forms of nuclear

technology. Assertions of right to enrichment and reprocessing technologies need to be weighed against the fundamental non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty. A world in which many states were in possession of technologies that permit the production of fissile materials would be a less secure world – a world in which the maintenance of a peaceful international order would be less assured.

6. And it needs to be kept in mind that the products of enrichment and reprocessing technologies are not of direct benefit to civil communities. These technologies are merely adjuncts to the production of nuclear power which is of direct benefit. The real challenge is to find ways of increasing confidence as to the availability of reliable and affordable external supplies of nuclear fuel and access to spent fuel services – in other words, to find ways of helping states wishing to benefit from nuclear power to feel comfortable with the idea that it makes more sense to use international fuel services than to invest in expensive fuel cycle technologies of limited application.
7. We recognise that countries which do not develop their own fuel cycle – for whatever reasons – will want assurances that nuclear fuel and related services will be available to them. We strongly support efforts to meet this concern. We therefore warmly welcome the recent publication of the IAEA Experts' Group report - 'Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle' - and look forward to playing a full part in the international discussions on these approaches.
8. Having said all of this, let me stress that the United Kingdom recognises the essential role which technology transfer plays in development and that we are fully committed to the principle that States Party should be able to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology provided this is not at the expense of the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.
9. And we support this principle by our actions. The United Kingdom is a major provider of fuel cycle services, including enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities. We also participate in international projects to develop innovative reactors and fuel cycles that will offer higher standards of safety, sustainability and proliferation resistance. We remain a strong supporter of the IAEA's work in developing programmes that improve the technological, scientific and regulatory capabilities of States Party.
10. We also support the IAEA's Technical Co-operation programmes. We recognise that peaceful nuclear technology can contribute to enhancing global prosperity and to meeting Millennium Development Goals. We have an excellent record in providing funding for IAEA TC activities and this year have again contributed to the Technical Co-operation Fund in full and on time.
11. We look to the IAEA to continue to ensure that its programmes focus, to a great extent, on the major development challenges faced by its Member States. Wherever appropriate, IAEA programmes should contribute to poverty reduction strategies and be co-ordinated with the interventions of other donors through such frameworks as the UN Development Assistance Framework.

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

12. Madam Chair, a recent leak at the THORP reprocessing plant in Sellafield was widely reported in the media. States Party may be interested to know that the leak was contained in the safety vessel designed for that purpose and that there have been no releases to the environment, or harm to personnel and that the plant is in a safe quiescent state. On discovering the problem the operator, British Nuclear Group Sellafield Limited, set up a plant incident control centre and the regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, has been kept well informed of the developing situation and to date is satisfied with the way the operator has dealt with the event. Plans are being developed by the operator to rectify the situation.
13. Let me stress that the United Kingdom has a flexible goal-setting regulatory regime that demands and achieves high standards of nuclear safety from its nuclear operators. At the recent third review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The United Kingdom demonstrated this by submitting its safety standards and practices to peer review. The United Kingdom hopes many more States will become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the international development of safety standards.
14. The United Kingdom fully supports the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This was notified to the Director General of the IAEA on 4 November 2003. We believe the Code makes a significant contribution to the goal of preventing terrorist access to radioactive materials. We urge widespread adoption of the Code.
15. The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Preventing terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials is fundamental to our security. The UK believes that the IAEA has a unique role to play in international work to combat the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. We are a strong and active supporter of its activities in this area and we recently made a further contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund. To date, the total of the UK's contributions to the NSF stands at £1.3 million. We call on those who have yet to contribute to do so.

SAFETY OF TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

16. Madam Chair, a number of States Party have commented on questions relating to the transport, particularly the maritime transport, of nuclear material. I would just like to underline that the United Kingdom, as a state which engages in nuclear maritime transport, has taken steps to ensure that the safety and security conditions under which this activity takes place, are stringent – and that when the safety standards were voluntarily submitted to examination by outside experts in 2003 (I am referring to an IAEA TranSAS mission) they were found to be satisfactory. These standards have been, and will continue to be, kept under constant review. I would also like to stress that the safety record of this industry, over a period in excess of 30 years, has been impressive. Finally, may I recall that, since the last RevCon, transport of nuclear material has been the subject of

extensive discussion in the IAEA (at a specialised conference and at General Conferences). These discussions have been marked by a spirit of constructive engagement and have resulted in considerable meeting of minds. The UK welcomes this and will, for its part, approach future discussions in a similar spirit.

Thank you Madam Chair.